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The universality assumption (“U”) that quantum wave states only evolve by linear 
or unitary dynamics has led to a variety of paradoxes in the foundations of physics.  
U is not directly supported by empirical evidence but is rather an inference from 
data obtained from microscopic systems.  The inference of U conflicts with 
empirical observations of macroscopic systems, giving rise to the century-old 
measurement problem and subjecting the inference of U to a higher standard of 
proof, the burden of which lies with its proponents.  This burden remains unmet 
because the intentional choice by scientists to perform interference experiments that 
only probe the microscopic realm disqualifies the resulting data from supporting an 
inference that wave states always evolve linearly in the macroscopic realm.  
Further, the nature of the physical world creates an asymptotic size limit above 
which interference experiments, and verification of U in the realm in which it 
causes the measurement problem, seem impossible for all practical purposes if 
nevertheless possible in principle.  This apparent natural limit serves as evidence 
against an inference of U, providing a further hurdle to the proponent’s currently 
unmet burden of proof.  The measurement problem should never have arisen 
because the inference of U is entirely unfounded, logically and empirically. 
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Just as logicians are bound by the laws of physics, physicists are bound by the rules of 
logic.  Some of the most persistent problems and paradoxes in the foundations of physics, many 
of which have been unsuccessfully tackled by physicists and mathematicians for nearly a century, 
persist exactly because they aren’t really physics or mathematics problems at all but rather 
problems of logic.   
Consider the well-known problems of Schrödinger’s Cat (“SC”) (Schrödinger (1935)) and 
its conscious cousin, Wigner’s Friend (“WF”) (Wigner (1961)).  If SC is characterized as, “A cat 
in state |𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒⟩ + |𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑⟩1 is simultaneously dead and alive” (e.g., Wang et al. (2016)), then SC is 
inherently impossible because dead and alive are mutually exclusive.  Therefore, if SC is 
physically possible, at least in principle, then it is patently false that a cat in state |𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒⟩ + |𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑⟩ 
is simultaneously dead and alive.  Indeed, the characterization of any object in a quantum 
superposition of eigenstates of some observable as being “simultaneously in those eigenstates” is 
equally problematic. 
While SC is not inherently paradoxical, it is more than a little odd.  The generally accepted 
conclusion that a SC state is possible in principle2 follows directly from the assumption that the 
mathematics of quantum mechanics (i.e., the linear or unitary evolution of a wave state) applies 
universally at all scales, including both electron and cat.  This assumption leads to a variety of 
foundational issues in physics, perhaps most notably the century-old measurement problem 
(“MP”) of quantum mechanics (“QM”).  MP is actually a paradox, meaning that it comprises 
logically incompatible assumptions.  Contradictions are necessarily false and cannot exist in 
nature.  If the conjunction of statements A and B, for example, leads to a contradiction, then at 
least one of statements A and B is false.  Often, MP has been characterized as the conjunction of 
three or more assumptions (e.g., Maudlin (1995) and Brukner (2017)); the logical incompatibility 
of these assumptions has been shown many times (e.g., Frauchiger and Renner (2018), Brukner 
(2018), and Bong et al. (2020)).  A simpler characterization of MP, reducing it to two assumptions, 
has been provided by Gao (2019): 
 
P1) The mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function. 
P2) The wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equation (such as the 
Schrödinger equation). 
 
1 To simplify arguments, normalization constants in quantum superpositions will be neglected throughout this paper. 
2 No one argues that producing or measuring SC would be easy in practice, and several references (e.g., Mari et al. 
(2016), Skotiniotis et al. (2017), Fröwis et al. (2018), and Aaronson et al. (2020 Preprint)) offer explanations why 
interesting macroscopic quantum superpositions, like SC, would be particularly difficult to produce or measure.  
Having said that, not all commentators are forthright about this.  Deutsch (1985), for example, in describing a modified 
WF experiment which, he claims, would distinguish a collapse theory of QM from the many worlds interpretation, 
hides the complexity and difficulty of such an experiment by representing them mathematically.  He provides no 
details on how such an actual experiment might be performed and instead nonchalantly characterizes it as one 
“involving... fairly detailed adjustments inside an observer’s brain and sense organs.” 
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Assumption P2 is often characterized as the “universality” of QM, in that the mathematical 
rules of QM apply universally at all scales.  Kastner (2020) correctly notes that “unitary-only 
evolution” is a better description than “universality” because, she argues, a complete theory of QM 
(if there is one) will necessarily apply universally but its wave functions may not evolve in a purely 
unitary, linear, or time-reversible fashion.3  Whether meaning “universal” or “unitary-only,” in this 
paper assumption P2 will generally be referred to as “U.” 
Because at least one of P1 and U is indeed false, a simultaneous belief in both is due to 
faulty reasoning.  The measurement problem is not a problem with nature; it is a problem with us.  
It is either the case that P1 is the result of improper assumptions and/or reasoning, that U is the 
result of improper assumptions and/or reasoning, or both.  Conventional wisdom seems to demand 
that anyone who attacks U is obligated to provide the supplemental explanation and mathematical 
modification necessary to account for nonlinearity – i.e., U is presumed true until proven false.4  
Several researchers have admirably attempted to assume that burden, most notably the “GRW” 
spontaneous collapse of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (1986) and gravitational collapse of Penrose 
(1996). 
My goal in this paper is to attack U on a variety of grounds without assuming any obligation 
to account for or explain nonlinearity.  A fascinating example of this atypical approach is that of 
D’Ariano (2020), who argues that “unitarity of the realisation of quantum transformations is a 
spurious postulate [that is] inessential [and] not falsifiable.”  The author further concludes that the 
black hole information paradox and Schrödinger’s Cat conundrum, among others, disappear as 
logical paradoxes and that interpretations of QM that assume U (including many worlds, relational, 
and transactional interpretations) cannot be falsified and “should not be taken too seriously.”  
Specifically, I will argue in this paper that U is actually an invalid inference that is not 
supported by the existing evidence and should never have been accepted.  The high and currently 
unmet burden of proving the validity of the inference of U remains with its proponents.  
Consequently, the measurement problem should never have arisen because the inference of U is 
scientifically unfounded. 
 
II. THE INVALID INFERENCE OF U 
 
A. What’s the Problem? 
 
The measurement problem is inextricably related to SC and WF and might be colloquially 
phrased as, “If a cat can exist as a superposition over macroscopically distinct eigenstates |𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑⟩  
and |𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒⟩, then why do we always see either a dead or a live cat?”  Or: “If quantum mechanics 
 
3 She argues that because U is “not an established fact” and “provides no way to get single outcomes out of any 
measurement,” we should take seriously the possibility of non-unitary collapse. 
4 I cannot find in the academic literature a justification for this belief despite its apparent pervasiveness among 
physicists.  The typical reasoning, which implicitly places the burden of proof on the skeptics of U, is given by Brukner 
(2018): “There is nothing in quantum theory making it applicable to three atoms and inapplicable to 1023.”   
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applies universally at all scales (or wave functions always evolve linearly, or all physical 
interactions are reversible), then why do we never observe quantum superpositions?”  Or even 
better: “Why don’t we see quantum superpositions?”   
MP is actually a paradox and any solution to it requires showing that at least one of its 
assumptions is incorrect.  All formulations of the measurement problem depend on the assumption 
of U; MP would be solved if it were shown, for example, that QM wave states did not evolve 
linearly in systems large enough to effect measurement.  After 100 years, why has this not yet been 
shown?  Perhaps this is the wrong question.  The first questions we might ask are: were we justified 
in assuming U in the first place?  Has it been empirically demonstrated? 
U is itself an inference because a conclusion that a wave state always evolves linearly, 
based on a limited number of data points, requires inductive reasoning.  The question is not whether 
logical inferences based on inductive reasoning can be made in science – despite philosophical 
arguments to the contrary (e.g., Popper and Miller (1983)), I, and certainly those who endorse U, 
believe that valid scientific inferences can be made.  One can never prove that a scientific 
hypothesis or law always holds; rather, it can only be adequately verified to permit such an 
inference, subject always to the possibility of experimental falsification.   
What constitutes “adequate verification” in science is akin to the legal issue, in court cases, 
of evidentiary standard or burden of proof.  For example, legal cases in the U.S. may be subject to 
proof under various standards, such as “preponderance of evidence,” “clear and convincing 
evidence,” or “beyond a reasonable doubt,” depending in part on whether the case is civil or 
criminal.  Just as a plaintiff assumes the burden of proving her claim to the required standard, the 
scientist who asserts the validity of an inference assumes the relevant burden of proof; those who 
assert the inference of U therefore assume the burden of showing its validity.  In the following 
analysis, I aim to address the extent to which available evidence meets, or actually increases, that 
burden. 
U is a very special kind of inference, one that I will argue in the following sections is 
invalid.  First, U has been tested and verified only in microscopic regimes.  No experiment has 
shown it to apply to macroscopic regimes and there is no direct experimental evidence for the 
applicability of linear QM dynamics to macroscopic systems.  Second, the lack of such evidence 
is not for lack of trying.  Rather, there seems to be a kind of natural asymptotic limit to the size of 
a system to which we are able to gather such evidence.  Third, U gives rise to the measurement 
problem – that is, it conflicts with what seems to be good empirical evidence that linear and time-
reversible QM dynamics do not apply in most5 cases.  These together, as I will argue, render U an 
invalid inference.   Further, even if one disagrees with this argument, the burden of proof remains, 
as it always has, with the proponents of U, not the skeptics.   
Regarding the first point – that U has been verified only in the microscopic realm – there 
are certainly those who choose to tamper with the colloquial meanings of the words “microscopic” 
and “macroscopic,” or attempt to redefine “mesoscopic” as “nearly macroscopic,” to bolster their 
 
5 It is important to note how strong a claim U is: even a single counterexample is adequate to produce the apparent 
contradiction of MP and call U into question. 
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case.6  Some may include as “macroscopic quantum superpositions” atoms in superposition over 
position eigenstates separated by a meter, or “macroscopic” (though barely visible) objects in 
superposition over microscopically-separated position eigenstates (e.g., O’Connell et al. (2010)).  
I regard these characterizations as sophistry, particularly when such examples are used as empirical 
evidence that the creation and measurement of interesting macroscopic superpositions, such as SC 
and WF, are mere technological hurdles.  Nevertheless, I will assume that any physicist acting in 
good faith will readily admit that there is currently no direct empirical evidence that linear wave 
state evolution applies to a cat, a human, or even a virus.  That lack of experimental evidence need 
not interfere with making a valid inference – which by its nature is an assertion that is not directly 
supported by evidence – unless that inference conflicts with other observations.  Consider these 
statements: 
 
A1) Newton’s law of gravity applies universally. 
A2) The observed perihelion of Mercury is in conflict with Newton’s law of gravity. 
 
Statement A1 had been accepted as a valid inference for a very long time.  The conjunction 
of these two statements, however, is a contradiction, implying that at least one of them is false.  A 
contradiction sheds new doubt on each statement and increases the evidence necessary to verify 
each unless and until one of the assumptions is shown false.  Despite enormous quantities of data 
supporting an inference of A1, conflicting evidence ultimately led Einstein to reject A1 and 
formulate General Relativity. 
The measurement problem is such a paradox; it is the conjunction of two or more 
statements that leads to a contradiction.  If there were no paradox, one might have inferred U based 
only on the limited experimental data showing interference effects from electrons, molecules, etc.  
However, U is in direct logical conflict with other statements the veracity of which we seem to 
have a great deal of evidence.  Therefore, to justify the inference of U, we need more than a reason: 
we need a good reason.  However, given that the paradox arose essentially simultaneously with 
quantum theory, leading Erwin Schrödinger (1935) to propose his hypothetical cat as an intuitive 
argument against U, the burden of proof has always lain with those who assert U.  Have they met 
their burden?  Do we have good evidence to support the inference of U? 
 
B. Fighting Fire with Fire 
 
Many (perhaps most) physicists have never questioned the assumption of U, and once 
asked whether we have good evidence to support the inference of U may regard the question itself 
as nonsense.  “Of course the wave function always evolves linearly – just look at the equations!”  
Indeed, standard QM provides no mathematical formalism to explain, predict, or account for 
breaks in linearity.  Some collapse theories do posit such breaches, but no experiment has yet 
 
6 Fröwis et al. (2018) thoroughly discuss the meaning of “macroscopic” but generalize that “macroscopic is a synonym 
for large” and “macroscopic quantumness means quantum coherence between macroscopically distinct states.” 
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confirmed any of them or distinguished them from other interpretations of QM.  It is thus tempting, 
when evaluating U, to glance at the equations of QM and note that they do, indeed, evolve linearly.  
But the question isn’t whether the equations evolve linearly, but whether the physical world always 
obeys those equations, and the answer to that question does not appear within the QM formalism 
itself.7 
Modern physicists, who rely heavily on mathematics to proceed, typically demand rigorous 
mathematical treatment in addressing and solving physics problems.  Ordinarily, such demands 
are appropriate.  However, MP arises directly as a result of the mathematics of QM, in which the 
Schrödinger equation evolves in a unitary and reversible fashion.  Because MP is itself a product 
of the mathematics of QM, its solution is inherently inaccessible via the symbolic representations 
and manipulations that produced it.  If the math itself is internally consistent – and I have no reason 
to believe otherwise – then you cannot use the math of QM as evidence that the math of QM is 
always correct.8  You can, however, use empirical evidence to support such an inference.  Do we 
have such evidence?   
 
C. Empirical Data Do Not Support an Inference of U 
 
Whether empirical data are sufficient to validate a particular scientific inference is a 
question about which reasonable scientists may differ.  However, we can all agree that a single 
datum in the abstract is inadequate to infer that a particular hypothesis always holds.  I will argue 
in this section that whether additional data provide further evidence to validate that inference 
depends on the source of those data and the choice of experiments that produced them. 
Consider, for example, a scientist at home who uses a barometer to measure the 
atmospheric pressure in his kitchen.  From this single datum – say, 1 atm – he infers that the 
pressure is 1 atm not just in his home, but everywhere in the universe.  Obviously, no reasonable 
scientist would agree that this datum is adequate to infer such a universal statement.  In response 
to this objection, the scientist then takes another measurement, this time in his dining room, and 
offers this second datum as further evidence to support his inference.  However, this additional 
datum, resulting from an experiment inside his home, provides no further evidence beyond the 
first datum to validate an inference about the atmospheric pressure beyond his home.  He can 
continue to take more measurements and collect more data, but to the extent that he chooses his 
home in which to take those measurements, the data do nothing to bolster the original invalid 
inference. 
Of course, the scientist may have other reasons to validate inferences.  For instance, if he 
knows that the air in his home is roughly in equilibrium with the air in a nearby neighbor’s home 
 
7 Unless you count the “projection postulate,” which some might argue is prima facie evidence that the QM equations 
do not always evolve linearly. 
8 Some go further and assert that the beauty, symmetry, and/or simplicity of linear dynamical evolution are evidence 
for their universal applicability.  I disagree: aesthetic arguments are not empirical evidence for a scientific hypothesis.  
(See, e.g., Hossenfelder (2018).) 
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(which is at the same altitude), then he might validly infer, based on the single datum from his 
kitchen, that the atmospheric pressure in his neighbor’s home is 1 atm.  However, in the absence 
of other reasons to validate the inference, if the scientist’s first measurement in his home is 
inadequate to infer a universal claim, then subsequent measurements in his home are equally 
inadequate.  If the first datum did not meet the scientist’s burden of proof, whatever that burden 
happens to be, then neither do those subsequent measurements. 
That said, let’s consider what kind of empirical evidence might support a scientific 
inference.  Imagine two concentric circles, the inner circle designated Region A and the outer 
circle, which encloses Region A, designated Region B.  Several experiments are done and all 
resulting data points support Hypothesis X.  Eventually, after many more experiments, it is noted 
that no data have ever falsified X, and the statement “X applies universally” becomes generally 
accepted in the scientific community.  At some point, a skeptic points out that all data points are 
enclosed in Region A and asks for evidence that Hypothesis X can be validly inferred to apply in 
Region B.  Imagine the ensuing hypothetical discussion between the skeptic and proponent of X: 
 
Proponent: “Every single experiment we have done confirms X.  We cannot 
possibly do every experiment, so if we’re ever justified in making a scientific 
inference, then at some point we have to accept that enough experiments have been 
done and the inference is valid.  If you’re still skeptical, we’ll do another 
experiment – and look!  The outcome, once again, supports X.” 
 
Skeptic: “Yes, but you have specifically chosen experiments that probe Region A.  
You assert that the data in Region A support an inference that X applies in Region 
B, but you intentionally choose experiments that can only produce data in Region 
A.  The fact that you have chosen experiments that exclude outcomes in Region B, 
specifically on the basis that they exclude outcomes in Region B, invalidates your 
data as supporting your inference.  You can do a million more experiments, and 
perhaps none of them will falsify X.  But as long as you choose experiments that 
only probe Region A, those experiments will fail to provide support for an inference 
that X applies in Region B.” 
 
Proponent: “It is true that we have only probed Region A.  But that is because it 
is very technologically challenging to do an experiment that probes Region B, and 
we do not currently have the funding.  But it is possible in principle to probe Region 
B, so we will someday be able to do so, and we have no reason to believe that X 
will not apply to Region B.” 
 
Skeptic: “That is not the question.  The question is this: right now, based on the 
existing empirical data, do you have reason to believe that X does apply to Region 
B?  The burden of proof rests with the proponent of the inference.” 
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Of course, in the context of MP, Region A is the microscopic realm and Region B is the 
macroscopic realm.  I will argue in this section that because the only available data come from 
experiments that are chosen specifically by experimenters on the basis of probing microscopic 
systems, these data inherently do not and cannot support an inference that QM wave states evolve 
linearly in macroscopic systems.   
The rules of QM allow us to make probabilistic predictions on the outcomes of 
measurements that differ from the expectations of classical probability.  In a very real sense, this 
is both how QM was discovered9 as well as what makes an event quantum mechanical.  Wave 
functions of objects can always be written as a superposition of terms (corresponding to distinct 
eigenstates) having complex probability amplitudes, and interference between those terms in an 
experiment can alter outcome probabilities from what might be expected classically.  A 
demonstration of quantum effects, then, depends on an interference experiment – i.e., an 
experiment that demonstrates interference effects in the form of altered probability distributions.  
In that sense, quantum mechanics is fundamentally about making probabilistic predictions that 
depend on whether interference effects from terms in a coherent superposition are relevant.10  Like 
the proponent in the hypothetical conversation above, proponents of U often claim that no violation 
of the linearity of QM has ever been observed, or that no experiment has ever shown that the 
mathematics of QM is not universally applicable.  (See, e.g., Deutsch (1985).)  How good is this 
evidence as an assertion to support the inference of U?  Consider the following claim, perhaps 
supported by the vast majority of physics:  
 
“The mathematics of QM applies to every object subjected to a double-slit interference 
experiment, no matter how massive, because no experiment has ever demonstrated a violation.”   
 
Indeed, double-slit interference experiments (“DSIE”) over the past century have been 
successfully performed on larger and larger (though still microscopic) objects, such as a C60 
molecule.  (See, e.g., Arndt et al. (1999).)  However, to evaluate the extent to which this evidence 
supports an inference of U, it is necessary to consider how DSIEs are set up and performed.  Nature 
– thanks to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle – creates superpositions ubiquitously. Quantum 
uncertainty, loosely defined for a massive object as ∆𝑥(𝑚∆𝑣) ≥ ℏ/2, guarantees dispersion of 
quantum wave packets, thus increasing the size of location superpositions over time.  However, 
interactions with fields, photons, and other particles ever-present in the universe constantly 
 
9 The characterization of light as discrete particle-like objects, thanks to Planck’s use of 𝑝 = ℏ𝑘 to avoid the Ultraviolet 
Catastrophe and Einstein’s explanation of the photoelectric effect, showed that classical probability is inapplicable to 
predicting the detection outcome of individual particles in a double-slit interference experiment. 
10 Like all probability rules, a statistically significant ensemble is necessary to obtain useful information. A 
measurement on any object will always yield a result that is consistent with that object’s not having been in a 
superposition; only by measuring many identically prepared objects may the presence of a superposition appear in the 
form of an interference pattern. 
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“measure” the locations of objects and thus decohere11 these superpositions.  (See, e.g., Tegmark 
(1993) and Joos et al. (2013).)  This decoherence, which I’ll discuss in greater detail in Section 
II(D), explains both why we don't observe superpositions in our normal macroscopic world and 
also why visible interference patterns from quantum superpositions of non-photon objects12 are so 
difficult to create. 
For instance, let’s consider the nontrivial process, first performed by Davisson and Germer 
in 1927, of producing an electron in superposition state (|𝐴⟩ + |𝐵⟩), where |𝐴⟩ is the wave state 
corresponding to the electron traversing slit A in a double-slit plate while |𝐵⟩ is the wave state 
corresponding to the electron traversing adjacent slit B.  Electrons, one at a time, are passed 
through (and localized by) an initial collimating slit; quantum uncertainty results in dispersion of 
each electron’s wave state at a rate inversely proportional to the width of the collimating slit.  If 
the process is designed so that adequate time elapses before the electron’s wave state reaches the 
double-slit plate, and without an intervening decoherence event with another object, the electron’s 
wave will be approximately spatially coherent over a width wider than that spanned by both slits.  
If the electron then traverses the double-slit plate, its wave function becomes the superposition 
(|𝐴⟩ + |𝐵⟩).  Because such a superposition does not correspond to its traversing slit A or traversing 
slit B, it carries no “which-path” information about which slit the electron traversed.  If each 
electron is then detected at a sensor located sufficiently downstream from the double-slit plate, 
again without an intervening decoherence event, the spatial probability distribution of that 
electron’s detection will be calculable consistent with quantum mechanical interference effects. 
This lack of which-path information implies that the electron’s superposition coherence was 
maintained and thus the rules of quantum mechanics (not classical probability) would apply to 
probability distribution calculations.13  
Because the dispersion of an object’s wave function is directly proportional to Planck’s 
constant and inversely proportional to its mass, the ability to demonstrate the wave-like behavior 
of electrons is in large part thanks to the electron’s extremely small mass.14  The same method of 
producing superpositions – waiting for quantum dispersion to work its magic – has been used to 
produce double-slit interference effects of objects as large as a couple thousand atoms.  (See, e.g., 
Eibenberger et al. (2013) and Fein et al. (2019).)  However, the more massive the object, the slower 
the spread of its wave state and the more time is available for an event to decohere any possible 
 
11 The theory underlying decoherence is not incompatible with the assumption of U; in fact, many (if not most) of the 
proponents of decoherence specifically endorse U.  Rather, decoherence is often used to explain why it is so difficult 
to measure macroscopic objects in (coherent) superpositions. 
12 Interference effects of photons are actually quite easy to observe in part because photons do not self-interact and 
thus are not decohered by other radiation. Prior to the invention of lasers, a dense source of coherent photons, which 
confirmed light’s wave-like behavior, came directly from the sun. 
13 Indeed, the existence of which-path information – that is, a correlating fact about the passage of the electron through 
one slit or the other – is incompatible with existence of a superposition at the double-slit plane.  (See, e.g., Knight 
(2020).) 
14 We might alternatively say that the de Broglie wavelength of an electron can be made sufficiently large in a 
laboratory so as to reveal its wave nature. 
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superposition.  Are there other methods, besides quantum dispersion, to prepare an object for a 
DSIE?  I don’t know.  However, every successful DSIE to date has indeed depended on quantum 
dispersion of the object’s wave packet, and it is this evidence, not the hypothetical possibility of 
other experiments, that is available to support (or not) an inference of U. 
What does this evidence tell us?  To perform a DSIE on an object to demonstrate 
interference effects in a laboratory, the object is specifically chosen so that quantum dispersion is 
adequate, and decoherence can be sufficiently prevented, to make the object spatially coherent 
over a distance exceeding the slits.  Because both of these requirements become increasingly 
difficult with an increase in the object’s size, the objects of DSIE experiments are chosen by 
experimenters specifically because they are small.  This choice is relevant to the extent to which 
data, which exist only from experiments that probe microscopic systems, can be used to infer that 
experiments that probe macroscopic systems would have comparable results.  If microscopic 
objects are intentionally chosen for DSIEs because their size makes (practically) possible their 
preparation into states that are adequately spatially coherent to allow the subsequent demonstration 
of interference effects, then the outcomes of those DSIEs cannot provide new evidence for an 
inference that a DSIE on a macroscopic object would have the same outcome (or is even possible 
to perform).   
My goal is not to call into question the usefulness of interference experiments in 
demonstrating the applicability of unitary QM to objects in those experiments.15  My goal is to 
point out that if DSIEs are only performed on objects that are already adequately spatially coherent 
over a macroscopically resolvable distance, and if experimenters specifically choose objects that 
are microscopic (because, for example, issues of quantum dispersion and decoherence make other 
choices impractical), then there is a logical circularity in the claim that wave states always evolve 
linearly, even in macroscopic systems, on the basis that nonlinear dynamics have never been 
shown.  In other words, if a proponent asserts that the observation that “No DSIE has ever 
demonstrated a violation of linearity” supports the applicability of the data, which only exist in the 
microscopic realm, to the macroscopic realm, then that data can’t have resulted from experiments 
that are chosen to test only the microscopic realm.    
But that is exactly the case.  The reason for the choice, in this regard, is irrelevant.  I offered 
above a reason why DSIEs, which so far have depended on quantum dispersion of objects, become 
more difficult as the objects get larger.  Quantum interference effects may be shown in experiments 
other than DSIEs, but those experiments have so far still probed only microscopic realms.  
Scientists may offer any explanation they like – an alternative experiment is too complicated or 
costly, it’s not yet technologically viable, whatever – but if an actually-performed experiment is 
 
15 For example, if QM is indeed nonlinear through a physical collapse mechanism like that proposed by GRW (1986) 
or Penrose (1996), then such a collapse might be confirmed by first preparing a system in an appropriate superposition 
(which should, if properly measured, demonstrate interference effects), and then failing to observe interference effects.  
The ability to demonstrate, for example, a C60 molecule exhibiting interference effects puts a lower limit on the scale 
(mass, time period, etc.) to which a physical collapse mechanism would act.   
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chosen because it probes the microscopic realm, then the results from that experiment cannot 
support an inference to the macroscopic realm.   
It may well be true that no interference experiment has shown nonlinearity, but if all such 
experiments performed so far only probe the microscopic realm and – more importantly – if these 
experiments are quite literally chosen because they only probe the microscopic realm, then the fact 
that no interference experiment has ever shown a violation of linearity is simply not evidence to 
support the inference that QM is universally linear. 
 
D. Empirical Data Oppose an Inference of U 
 
In Section II(C), I argued that because all available data to support U come from 
experiments specifically chosen on the basis of not probing the macroscopic realm, these data are 
inadequate to validly infer U.  This observation is not evidence against the inference of U, which 
could be made for different reasons (although I am not aware of other reasons than those discussed 
in prior sections), but rather that the empirical data cannot meet the proponent’s burden of 
justifying that inference.  In this section, I will show that the experimenter’s choice is limited by 
the nature of the physical world in such a way that any attempts to probe systems beyond the 
microscopic realm seem to abut against an asymptotic limit, beyond which it is impossible to probe 
for all practical purposes (“FAPP”).  I will argue that this FAPP limit is actually prima facie 
evidence against an inference of U. 
If the reason that interference experiments are chosen to probe only the microscopic realm 
is merely that of convenience, or insufficient grant funding, or technological limitation, then my 
argument might be limited only to the conclusion that current empirical data do not support an 
inference of U, in which case the proponent’s burden of proof remains but does not necessarily 
increase.  However, if it turns out that interference experiments are chosen to probe only the 
microscopic realm because there is something about the physical world, directly related to the size 
of systems, that makes it impossible (at least FAPP) to probe larger systems, then this would serve 
as empirical evidence against U, in which case the proponent’s unmet burden of proving the 
inference of U is far greater.  I will now argue that the rate of quantum dispersion, which decreases 
with increasing size, coupled with decoherence mechanisms, which increase with increasing size, 
conspire to force the experimenter to choose interference experiments that only probe the 
microscopic.  That is, limitations inherent in nature, not the scientist’s limitations vis-à-vis funding 
or ingenuity, are what differentiate “microscopic” from “macroscopic” and prevent the scientist, 
for all practical purposes, from performing an experiment that would confirm interference effects 
in the macroscopic realm.   
Let me elaborate.  If an experimenter can rely on quantum dispersion to put a molecule in 
adequate spatial coherence to measure interference effects, why can’t he do that for a dust particle 
or a cat even if, as pointed out in Section II(C), it might be very challenging?  Consider the 
difficulty in performing a DSIE on a dust particle.  Let’s assume it is a 50μm-diameter sphere with 
a density of 1000 kg/m3 and has just been localized by an impact with a green photon (λ ≈ 500nm).  
12 
 
How long will it take for its location “fuzziness” to exceed its own diameter (which would be the 
absolute minimum spatial coherence allowing for passage through a double-slit plate)?  Letting 
∆𝑣 = ℏ/2𝑚∆𝑥 ≈ 10-18 m/s, it would take around 5x1013 seconds (about 1.5 million years) for the 
location uncertainty to reach a spread of 50μm.16  In other words, if we sent a dust particle into 
deep space, its location relative to other objects in the universe is so well defined due to its 
correlations to those objects that it would take over a million years for the universe to “forget” 
where the dust particle is to a resolution allowing for the execution of a DSIE.17  In this case, 
information in the universe would still exist to localize the dust particle to a resolution of around 
50μm, but not less. Unfortunately, this rough calculation depends on a huge assumption: that new 
correlation information isn’t created in that very long window of time.  In reality, the universe is 
full of particles and photons that constantly bathe (and thus localize) objects.  
Thus there is a trade-off in the delocalization caused by natural quantum dispersion and 
localizing “measurements” caused by interactions with the plethora of stuff whizzing through 
space.  This trade-off is heavily dependent on the size of the object; a tiny object (like an electron) 
disperses quickly due to its low mass and experiences a low interaction rate with other objects, 
allowing an electron to more easily demonstrate interference effects.  On the other hand, a larger 
object disperses more slowly while also suffering a much higher interaction rate with other objects.  
These observations can be quantified in terms of coherence lengths: for a particular decoherence 
source acting on a particular object, what is the largest fuzziness we might expect in the object's 




Table I.  Some values of coherence lengths for a 10μm dust particle and a 
bowling ball caused by various decoherence sources, given by Tegmark (1993). 
  
Tegmark (1993) calculates coherence lengths (roughly “the largest distance from the 
diagonal where the spatial density matrix has non-negligible components”) for a 10μm dust 
particle and a bowling ball caused by various decoherence sources, as shown in Table I.  Even in 
deep space, cosmic microwave background (“CMB”) radiation alone will localize the dust particle 
to a dimension many orders of magnitude smaller than its diameter, thus ruling out any possibility 
 
16 Tegmark (1993) notes that macroscopic systems tend to be in “nearly minimum uncertainty states.” 
17 This estimate completely neglects the additional time necessary to subsequently measure an interference pattern. 
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for that object to become adequately delocalized (and thus adequately spatially coherent) relative 
to the universe to perform an interference experiment.  The prospects are far worse for a bowling 
ball-sized cat – it simply cannot physically happen. 
In other words, as at least a practical matter, the physical world is such that there is a size 
limit to the extent that quantum dispersion can be relied upon to perform a DSIE.  Having said 
that, no one seriously argues (as far as I know) that SC or WF could be produced, even in principle, 
through natural quantum dispersion.  Rather, the typical argument is that SC/WF could be 
produced through amplification of a quantum event via a von Neumann (2018) measurement 
chain.18  Crucially, however, the purported linear amplification of a quantum superposition 
assumes universal linearity of QM, which means that it cannot be logically relied upon to 
contradict an argument (as in this paper) challenging that assumption.  Further, there is no 
empirical evidence that quantum amplification ever has produced a measurable macroscopic 
quantum superposition.19  In other words, without assuming that quantum amplification can 
accomplish what quantum dispersion cannot – i.e., ignoring the logical circularity of assuming the 
very conclusion that I am questioning – one must concede that existing empirical evidence does 
not support the assertion that a DSIE can in principle be performed on macroscopic objects like a 
cat. 
Consequently, a scientist’s choice in designing interference experiments is not merely on 
the basis of convenience – rather, the physical world is such that interference experiments 
inherently become increasingly difficult at an increasing rate as the size of an object increases.  
There seems to be an asymptotic limit20 on the size of an object on which we can, for all practical 
purposes, perform a DSIE.  The fact that nature herself imposes this limit is – or should be – telling 
us something fundamental about whether QM wave states always evolve linearly.  More to the 
point, this FAPP distinction between the microscopic and macroscopic realms serves as evidence 
against an inference of U. 
Importantly, I am not asserting that the above analysis shows that performing an 
interference experiment on a cat (or anything else) is impossible in principle.  Rather, it shows that 
 
18 Even if quantum dispersion of a cat’s wave packet could allow a DSIE, it is unclear why a cat state |cat>A 
corresponding to the cat passing through hole A would substantively differ, other than its position, from cat state |cat>B 
corresponding to the cat passing through hole B.  If the correlations among objects (such as atoms) within the cat do 
not depend on the cat’s position in hole A or B, then there is no interesting difference (in my opinion) between these 
two cat states, as it is really the same cat both from the cat’s and an observer’s perspective.  What makes the SC and 
WF problems interesting is the amplification of a quantum state into an entangled macroscopic superposition in which 
one term includes a state of a cat, such as |dead>, while another includes a magnificently different state of the cat, such 
as |alive>. 
19 A related objection is whether it is possible to adequately isolate or shield a macroscopic object from decoherence 
sources long enough for dispersion to work its magic.  The answer is no, for reasons, including logical circularity, that 
exceed the scope of this paper.  But, like the hypothetical proposed fix of amplification, there is no actual evidence 
that shielding or isolation ever has produced a measurable macroscopic superposition. 
20 I don’t mean this in a rigorous mathematical sense.  Rather there is some rough object size below which we are able, 
as a practical matter, to show interference effects of the object and above which we simply cannot.  We might loosely 
call this size the “Heisenberg cut.” 
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a fundamental feature of our physical world is that our efforts to demonstrate interference effects 
in DSIEs for larger systems have quickly diminishing returns; the harder we try to increase the 
size of an object to which QM is verifiably linear, the more slowly that size increases.  There is at 
least some physical size (perhaps within an order of magnitude or two of the dust particle in Table 
I) above which no conceivable experiment, no matter how technologically advanced, could 
demonstrate interference effects.  The fact that such a size exists to physically distinguish the 
“macroscopic” from the “microscopic,” which as a practical matter forces us to choose interference 
experiments that probe only the microscopic regime, is strong empirical evidence against an 
inference of U.  In other words, the existence of a FAPP limitation on the size of objects subject 
to interference experiments, even if there is no in-principle limitation, is itself evidence against an 




The burden of showing the validity of any scientific inference always lies with those who 
assert the inference.  Scientists may reasonably disagree about what standard might ordinarily be 
required, but that burden certainly increases if, as in this case, the inference is logically 
incompatible with one or more assertions (such as statement P1) for which we ostensibly have a 
great deal of evidence.  In other words, the fact that the century-old measurement problem 
continues to be taken seriously is good reason to subject all of its logically inconsistent 
assumptions, including the inference of U, to a higher standard of proof. 
Despite this heightened burden, I argued in Section II(C) that the empirical data, all of 
which derive from experiments that are chosen specifically to probe microscopic objects, do not 
meet any burden of showing that comparable experiments could be performed on macroscopic 
objects or that such experiments would verify U.  I further argued in Section II(D) that the existence 
of a FAPP size limit, derived from the fundamental nature of the physical world, to which 
interference experiments can be done is itself evidence against an inference of U.  Quite simply, 
the assumption of U is not scientifically justified as a valid inference because relevant empirical 
evidence supports only ¬U.  Not only have proponents failed to meet their burden to prove an 
inference of U, the existing data actually increase that burden.   
I cannot offer or conceive of any rational scientific or philosophical basis on which to 
accept such an inference.  For these reasons alone, from a scientific standpoint, MP should be 
outright dismissed – not because it has been solved, but because it should never have arisen as a 
problem in the first place.  MP, a contradiction, depends on the truth of at least two logically 
incompatible statements, one of which is U.  The burden of proof falls on proponents of U to 
support the validity of an inference of U, but I have shown above that the best empirical evidence 
is inadequate to support, and in fact opposes, an inference of U.  That burden remains with the 
proponents, not the skeptics; however, in light of the arguments above, that unmet burden is 
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